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Neoclassical economic theory
Environmental policy making based solely on neoclassical 
economic theory is insufficient, and sometimes totally 
misguided, for achieving the desired public response. 
Neoclassical economic theory describes how people should 
choose in certain situations, but it also claims to describe 
how people do choose (Thaler, 1979). Neoclassical economic 
theory is built on the assumptions that people ‘maximise 
utility’ (satisfaction), have rational economic preferences 
among identifiable outcomes, and act independently on the 
basis of  complete and relevant information. 
However, in certain situations people often act in ways 
that are inconsistent with neoclassical theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1979). Thaler (1979) found that, 
in these situations, neoclassical economic theory makes 
‘systemic errors in predicting behaviour’ (p.39). Dawnay and 
Shah (2005) identify problems with neoclassical economic 
theory as a tool for motivating effective behaviour change, 
specifically because it:
• doesn’t explain where preferences come from, and assumes 
preferences are fixed;
• finds altruism difficult to explain;
• disregards self-expectations and commitments; 
• assumes loss aversion does not exist; and 
• assumes people always act rationally and logically and 
have the ability to make the complex calculations required 
to make the best choices from many alternatives. 
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This paper surveys research on behaviour 
change and identifies ways that social 
psychology and behavioural economics can 
assist with environmental policy making. By 
understanding why and how people make 
decisions – and how decisions are affected 
by framing, habits, cognitive biases, and 
risk perception and interpretation – we can 
design policies that are more effective, less 
costly and more acceptable to the public.
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Insights from social psychology and behavioural economics
Behavioural economics is an emerging branch of  economics 
that integrates findings from social and cognitive psychology 
to better understand and predict people’s economic choices. 
Loss aversion, the endowment effect and the status quo bias 
mean that people can be resistant to change
Research shows that people dislike losing something more 
than they like gaining it, and will often take large risks to avoid 
losses while avoiding small risks to make gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1992; Dawnay and Shah, 2005). 
This is called loss aversion. People also place extra value on 
things they consider theirs, and are systemically unwilling 
to give their things up. This is known as the endowment 
effect (Thaler, 1992; Bender, Kandel and Goldstone, 2004; 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2008; Dawnay and Shah, 2005).
Loss aversion and the endowment effect mean that people 
demand much more to give something up than they would be 
prepared to pay to acquire it. This is contrary to neoclassical 
economic theory, which states that people should be willing 
to pay the same amount to acquire something as they will 
accept in compensation to be deprived of  it (Thaler, 1992). 
Cost-benefit analysis to value environmental goods typically 
involves using willingness-to-pay surveys (‘how much would 
you be prepared to pay to prevent X happening or to gain 
X?’) or willingness-to-accept surveys (‘how much would you 
be prepared to accept as compensation for X?’). Neoclassical 
economics assumes that there is no difference between the 
two survey types. However, in practice people’s willingness-
to-accept price has been shown to be up to 20 times their 
willingness-to-pay price (Dawnay and Shah, 2005).
Loss aversion and the endowment effect help to produce 
inertia, meaning that people are generally resistant to changes 
to the status quo (Thaler, 1992). Thaler describes this as the 
status quo bias: a preference for the current state that biases 
people against change unless there are persuasive incentives 
to change. Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s 1988 experiments 
showed that people have a strong inclination to retain the 
status quo. They found that when an option is presented as 
the status quo it becomes significantly more popular; and the 
more options people are given, the stronger the bias for the 
status quo (Thaler, 1992). 
Because of  the status quo bias, default options attract large 
market share (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Default options 
are pre-set choices – such as the chosen electricity provider 
when you move into a new house. People can opt to change 
providers, but it requires making an effort to switch. Research 
has shown that people generally stay with the default option 
(Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2007). People’s bias for defaults 
is reinforced by a common assumption that the default setter 
has implicitly endorsed the default (Sunstein and Thaler, 
2008). 
Implications for environmental policy 
• Policy makers should be aware of  the discrepancies 
between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept 
surveys. Dawnay and Shah (2005) warn that, in some 
situations, the type of  survey used may determine the 
outcome of  an analysis.
• The status quo bias suggests that policy makers may face 
resistance if  they frame a choice as a departure from the 
status quo.
• The endowment effect could suggest that people will be 
more open to environmental protection if  they consider 
the environmental goods as ‘theirs’.
• There is considerable opportunity to nudge people into 
environmentally desirable behaviour through ‘green’ 
defaults (for example, carbon neutral electricity providers). 
However, this raises the question of  which default should 
be set, and who determines it.
Framing and ordering affect the choices people make
People are very susceptible to how questions and problems 
are framed. Depending on how it is framed, the same 
information can lead to different outcomes. Framing 
information means presenting it in a way that will resonate 
in a certain way with a particular group of  people. Framing 
leads to predictably different choices 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1986; Milch et 
al., 2009). Because people are loss averse, 
whether information is framed in terms of  
losses or gains leads to systemically different 
decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). 
For example, telling people that conserving 
electricity will save them $X per year is 
significantly less effective than telling them 
that not conserving electricity will lose them 
$X per year (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). 
The order in which people consider benefits and costs has 
been shown to affect their choices (Milch et al., 2009; Swim 
et al., 2009). Hardisty, Johnson and Weber in 2006 conducted 
an experiment where an optional 2% fee was added to airline 
tickets, alternatively described as a ‘carbon tax’ and a ‘carbon 
offset’ to fund carbon reduction technologies (Gertner, 
2009). Passengers were asked to identify with a political 
group (Republican or Democrat, as it was an American 
experiment), and to write down their thoughts in order as 
they decided whether to pay. They found that 65% of  those 
identifying as Republicans were willing to pay for a carbon 
offset, but only 27% were prepared to pay for a carbon tax 
(Swim et al., 2009). Democrats were largely willing to pay 
for both. When Republicans considered a carbon tax they 
... when an option is presented as the status 
quo it becomes significantly more popular; and 
the more options people are given, the stronger 
the bias for the status quo 
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had very negative early thoughts about the costs of  the tax 
(resulting from a strong aversion to the tax frame), leading to 
strongly negative conclusions. When considering the carbon 
offset, both Republicans’ and Democrats’ early thoughts 
were more positive as they considered the benefits of  funding 
clean technology before the costs of  funding the offset, 
leading to positive overall conclusions and willingness to pay. 
People’s initial willingness to pay the 2% fee was determined 
by their receptiveness to the ‘tax’ and ‘offset’ frames (not the 
tax mechanism itself), which in turn affected whether they 
considered benefits or costs first (Gertner, 2009). 
Implications for environmental policy
• Framing policies as avoiding losses is more effective than 
framing in terms of  gaining benefits.
• The order in which people consider benefits and costs can 
influence their decisions. Prompting people to consider 
benefits before costs can make them more accepting of  
policy proposals.
Social norms are powerful influences on behaviour
Social norms are behavioural expectations and signals within 
groups and societies that directly and significantly encourage 
and guide behaviour (Schultz et al., 2007). The main 
influence on people’s behaviour is the behaviour of  other 
people, particularly people they like (long-lasting influence) 
and people in authority (shorter-term effects) (Sunstein and 
Thaler, 2008; Finkelstein, 2009; Dawnay and Shah, 2005). 
People learn their behaviour from watching others, and look to 
others for guidance on how to act (a phenomenon 
called social proof), deriving norms about what 
is appropriate and accepted behaviour (Swim et 
al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). Social norms are 
particularly influential in ambiguous or stressful 
situations, or when others are experts (Sunstein 
and Thaler, 2008; Dawnay and Shah, 2005). 
Sunstein and Thaler (2008) describe the 
extent to which people conform to social norms. 
They describe an experiment where taxpayers 
were sent four kinds of  information. One group 
was told that their tax money funded public 
goods, such as environmental protection; another group 
was threatened with information about the legal risks of  
not paying their taxes; a third group was given increased 
information on filling out their tax return form; and the final 
group was told that 90% of  people had already fulfilled their 
tax return obligations. The only intervention that had any 
effect on people’s behaviour was the final one, which told 
people that there was a high compliance rate. Direct appeals 
to altruism, increased information and threats did not have a 
noticeable effect on behaviour.
Research shows that people often assume that undesirable 
behaviours are more common than they really are (Shultz et 
al., 2007). Social norms marketing campaigns (campaigns that 
use normative messages to try to change ‘socially significant’ 
behaviour, such as alcohol consumption or recycling, for 
example) are increasingly being used as an alternative to 
more traditional approaches to behaviour change (such as 
information campaigns, appeals to altruism or appeals to 
people’s fears). These campaigns attempt to reduce undesired 
behaviour by letting people know that the behaviour is not as 
prevalent as they think (perceptions of  what is commonly done 
in a given situation are known as descriptive norms) However, 
this can have an undesired, ‘boomerang’ effect by increasing 
the behaviour in people who previously avoided it. Schultz 
et al. found that it was possible to avoid the boomerang 
effect by introducing another type of  norm to social norms 
marketing campaigns: a norm describing perceptions of  
what is commonly approved of  or disapproved of  within the 
society or group (an injunctive norm). They found that when 
household power bills displayed the average amount of  
electricity that other households in the same community were 
using (descriptive normative information), people tended to 
decrease or increase their electricity use to fit the norm. The 
undesired boomerang effect (low-energy users increasing 
their energy use to fit the norm) was prevented by giving 
people positive feedback (injunctive normative information). 
High-energy users received frowning-face emoticons  on 
their power bills, while low-energy users received smiley-
face emoticons  (Schultz et al., 2007; Swim et al., 2009; 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). The combination of  descriptive 
and injunctive normative messages meant that heavy users 
made even bigger cuts, and the light users remained frugal 
(Schultz et al., 2007).
Implications for environmental policy
• Public policy should marginalise undesired behaviour and 
refer to undesired behaviour as an individual action that 
can be controlled, not something that everyone is already 
doing (Finkelstein, 2009).
• Public policy should promote desired behaviour as the 
norm.
Group cooperation can lead to better public outcomes 
Numerous group and individual decisions pave the way 
for widespread support for policies (Gertner, 2009). To 
promote cooperation in making these decisions, it is crucial 
to understand the dynamics of  group and individual decision 
making (Gertner, 2009; Krantz et al., 2008). Research shows 
that, while both are important, the order in which they occur 
is significant (Gertner, 2009; Milch et al., 2009). 
People learn their behaviour from watching 
others, and look to others for guidance on 
how to act (a phenomenon called social 
proof), deriving norms about what is 
appropriate and accepted behaviour ...
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People inherently enjoy being part of  groups and display 
strong biases to in-group members (Dawnay and Shah, 
2005; Gertner, 2009). The more that people identify with 
a group, the more willing they are to make decisions that 
benefit the group as a whole (Van Vugt, 2009). Van Vugt’s 
(2001) water conservation experiments found, for example, 
that households with strong senses of  community identity 
did not need a financial incentive to conserve water during a 
water shortage. 
Group decision making has both advantages and 
disadvantages over individual decision making. Milch et 
al. (2009) found that groups tend to be more accurate in 
certain judgement tasks (such as estimating numbers and 
risk assessment) than individuals. However, group members 
often do not share information with the rest of  the group, 
and groups are sometimes more susceptible than individuals 
to decision-making biases.
Experiments simulating shared-resource (commons) 
dilemmas have shown that cooperation deteriorates when 
people experience (or believe that they are experiencing) 
inequality or inequity (Swim et al., 2009). Trust and fairness 
are crucial for overcoming commons dilemmas. Krantz et al. 
(2008) describe how environmental decisions often appear 
to be commons dilemmas, where ‘non-cooperation is the 
dominant strategy’, even though it makes everyone worse off  
in the long run. Activating cooperation within groups helps 
to overcome this problem. Krantz et al. suggest:
• encouraging individuals to conform to group norms;
• enabling individuals to share group successes; and
• ensuring individuals carry out group-role obligations.
Experiments at Columbia University’s Center for 
Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) have shown 
that introducing arbitrary group symbols – such as a blue 
star – and telling people that they belong to the ‘blue star 
team’ can increase group participation from 35 to 50%; 
while simply seating people at a table together can increase 
participation rates to 75% (Krantz et al., 2008). 
CRED researchers have also found that the order in 
which people consider decisions (group versus individual) 
has a significant effect on cooperation. When people make 
decisions as members of  groups before making them as 
individuals, their conversations involve more inclusive words 
like ‘us’ and ‘we’ than when they make them in the opposite 
order. Groups also tend to be more patient than individuals 
when considering delayed benefits (Gertner, 2009; Milch et 
al., 2009). 
Implications for environmental policy
• Building people’s sense of  community belonging and 
identity could lead to greater cooperation.
• Structuring the public decision-making process to involve 
groups early in the process could lead to a better balance 
between social outcomes and individual outcomes.
Altruism and people’s sense of fairness affect behaviour
Dawnay and Shah (2005) identify situations where people 
do not expect or even want payment, and find that financial 
rewards in fact occasionally act as a disincentive to desirable 
behaviour: for example, volunteer work where payment 
could detract from the warm fuzzy feeling of  doing a good 
deed. Ariely and Heyman (2004) found that in non-monetary 
exchange relationships, altruism leads to a 
performance level that is ‘high, constant, 
and insensitive to payment level’ (p.788). 
Financial penalties are usually expected to 
act as a disincentive to undesired behaviour, 
but have been found to sometimes have 
the unintended effect of  legitimising, and 
thus increasing, such behaviour (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000; Ariely and Heyman, 
2004). People feel guilty when they go 
against social norms and ‘do the wrong 
thing’, but fines have been shown to 
sometimes offset guilt by making people feel 
as though they have been punished and have atoned for their 
behaviour (Dawnay and Shah, 2005). To address problems 
with public goods allocation, neoclassical economic policies 
often redistribute tax revenue from polluting activities to 
the people most adversely affected. However, Dawnay and 
Shah found that this approach often makes people feel as if  
they are being bribed to accept the polluting activity, which 
undermines their motivation to ‘do the right thing’. They 
found that it is more effective to directly address people’s 
concerns. 
People’s willingness to pay for public goods is affected by 
how fairly they think costs and benefits are distributed. The 
more fairly people perceive the process and the outcome to 
be, the more they will contribute. Bender et al. (2004) found 
that when people were given money to allocate between their 
own use and a public good, most contributed about 50% to 
a public good. However, Fehr and Gächter (2002) found that 
without altruistic punishment, cooperation breaks down. 
Altruistic punishment is when people punish those who do not 
cooperate, even though punishment is expensive and there 
is no material gain for the punisher. Fehr, Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2002) found that, if  treated fairly, people often both 
cooperate voluntarily and apply altruistic punishment. This 
is called strong reciprocity. They found that strong reciprocity 
can lead to ‘almost universal cooperation in circumstances 
in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a 
... promoting environmentally responsible 
behaviour is generally unhelpful, as it leads to 
feelings of helplessness by ‘concentrating on 
sacrifice rather than quality-of-life-enhancing 
solutions’.
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complete breakdown of  cooperation’ (Fehr, Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2002, p.1). Fehr and Fischbacher’s 2004 research 
found that altruism can evolve so that cooperation becomes 
the default behaviour in large groups – so long as people not 
only altruistically punish those who do not cooperate, but 
also punish people who fail to apply altruistic punishment 
(Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004; Buchanan, 2005). 
Care needs to be taken when appealing directly to 
people’s altruism. Kaplan (2000) found that the usual 
altruism-centred approach to promoting environmentally 
responsible behaviour is generally unhelpful, as it leads to 
feelings of  helplessness by ‘concentrating on sacrifice rather 
than quality-of-life-enhancing solutions’ (p.1). Likewise, 
attempting to motivate people with fear can be unhelpful, 
as it can lead people to minimise or ignore problems (Stern, 
2005). When people feel they don’t have control over a 
situation, they are much less likely to cooperate 
or to see much point in changing their behaviour 
(Zax, 2009; Dawnay and Shah, 2005). 
Implications for environmental policy
• To prevent people feeling helpless, policy 
makers should take a participatory approach to 
forming policy or choosing policy instruments, 
and also avoid overloading people with excess 
information and choice (Dawnay and Shah, 
2005).
• Policies should build on the control people 
do have over their environment, and empower people to 
help manage their local resources.
• Policy makers should be cautious with financial incen-
tives and penalties, as they can have unintended 
consequences.
Habits are significant obstacles to behaviour change 
Bender et al. (2004) describe how following others’ behaviour, 
and our own habits, creates shortcuts, allowing us to 
‘economise on mental effort’. Whenever we make a decision 
we have three options: follow others, repeat an action we’ve 
previously taken, or choose anew. Because it is much easier 
for us to take a shortcut – and follow others or our own 
previous behaviour – we generally do take shortcuts rather 
than choose anew. Easy decisions with known, hassle-free 
outcomes produce rewarding feelings, which in turn reinforce 
those decisions in a feedback loop, creating habits. Habits can 
be difficult to change if  they are frequently repeated and if  
there are strong associated rewards, particularly immediately 
following the action (Dawnay and Shah, 2005).
Dawnay and Shah found that the first step to breaking 
undesirable habits is simply being made aware of  them. 
Once we are conscious of  a habit, we can assess the benefits 
and costs of  other behaviours. We may then choose to adopt 
a new behaviour, which, in time, becomes a new habit. Visual 
cues can be helpful in changing habits, as they can remind us 
of  desirable behaviour.
 
Implications for environmental policy 
• Where public policy is trying to change behaviour, 
particularly something that is clearly a habit, then 
social psychology and behavioural economics become 
significantly more important than simple neoclassical 
economic incentives.
• Policy makers should be aware of  the existence and 
strength of  pre-existing habits that may hinder people in 
changing their behaviour.
• Environmental policy should make people aware of  
their unconscious habits and of  preferred alternative 
behaviours, and should provide a variety of  incentives 
to adopt environmentally conscious habits, as well as 
providing people with prompt feedback to spur and 
reinforce desired behaviour change, such as visual cues 
(for example, colourful recycling bins with bottle-shaped 
holes).
Divergence of self-expectations and behaviour can lead to 
cognitive dissonance
When our actual behaviour diverges from our expectation 
of  how we usually behave (or from our perception of  how 
others expect us to behave) we often feel uncomfortable. 
This is known as cognitive dissonance, and either our self-
expectations or our behaviour must change to resolve it 
(Dawnay and Shah, 2005; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan and 
Jaeger, 2001). Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan and Jaeger (2001) 
showed that people find the consequences of  climate change 
alarming. However, they also found that people find the idea 
of  changing their energy-intensive lifestyles more daunting. 
These competing tensions create cognitive dissonance, 
and people form ‘socio-psychological denial mechanisms’, 
meaning they overestimate costs and underestimate benefits 
of  shifting to less energy-intensive behaviour while blaming 
other people’s and government’s inaction.
If  we have publicly expressed our attitudes or beliefs, we 
are more likely to change our behaviour so that it remains 
consistent with them (Dawnay and Shah, 2005). Therefore, 
commitments and promises are important for ensuring people 
stick to behaviour. When people make a small commitment 
(for example, signing a petition), they are more likely to 
agree to make a much larger commitment a few days later 
(for example, donating money). People are also more likely to 
stick to a commitment if  it is public, if  they verbally agree or 
write down their intentions, or if  they make the commitment 
as a member of  a group (Finkelstein, 2009).
When our actual behaviour diverges from 
our expectation of how we usually behave 
(or from our perception of how others  
expect us to behave) we often feel 
uncomfortable. 
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Implications for environmental policy
• Knowledge of  the effect of  commitments and promises 
would help policy makers design better policy options. 
Understanding key public perceptions would help avoid 
undesirable policy responses, such as those arising from 
cognitive dissonance.
• Policies should encourage people to make small 
commitments, make commitments public and build on 
small commitments.
Asymmetric discounting biases people towards the present
As part of  cost-benefit analysis, economists typically discount 
future costs and benefits relative to present costs and benefits. 
The discount rate is the rate at which future outcomes are 
devalued. Determining the correct discount rate to make 
cost-benefit choices between different environmental policy 
proposals is one of  the biggest uncertainties in environmental 
economics, particularly the economics of  climate change. 
However, to predict how people will respond to different 
environmental policy proposals, we need to understand 
people’s perceptions of  intertemporal trade-offs (for example, 
between the economy and the environment). This requires 
understanding the actual discount rates that are implicit in 
people’s intertemporal decisions (Hardisty and Weber, 
2009).
Research shows that people often implicitly discount 
‘irrationally’; that is, in ways contrary to the predictions of  
neoclassical economic theory (Weber et al., 2008; Dawnay 
and Shah, 2005; Hardisty and Weber, 2009; Thaler, 1992). 
People underestimate future benefits and overestimate 
future costs, and they also over-value present benefits and 
under-value future benefit. People typically discount gains 
more than losses and discount small outcomes more than 
large outcomes. Weber et al.’s (2008) experiments showed 
that people demand more in compensation for delaying 
consumption than they are prepared to give up in order to 
accelerate consumption. 
This asymmetrical intertemporal discounting of  costs and 
benefits poses problems in dealing with environmental issues 
like climate change. Actions to mitigate climate change incur 
immediate, tangible costs and sacrifice immediate, tangible 
benefits. Their future, uncertain and abstract benefits are 
discounted. Hardisty and Weber’s (2009) research found 
that people’s strong negative reactions to immediate costs 
and sacrifices mean that it is unlikely that people will make 
decisions leading to long-term sustainable behaviour.
Weber et al. (2008) greatly reduced intertemporal 
discounting in people’s choices by manipulating the order in 
which the participants in their research considered the benefits 
of  immediate or delayed consumption. When prompted to 
argue for delayed consumption first, participants showed 
‘drastically reduced’ intertemporal discounting. Hardisty and 
Weber (2009) found that social norms typically determine 
the order that people consider different options. 
Implication for environmental policy 
• Controlling the order in which individuals and groups 
consider the benefits of  immediate or delayed consumption 
can reduce intertemporal discounting.
People use both analytical and emotional 
decision-making processes to process risk; 
risk experienced via personal experience is 
more motivating than risk experienced via 
description
People use two systems to process and assess 
risk: analytical (or reflective) and emotional 
(or associative, affective) (Gertner, 2009; 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2008; Swim et al., 
2009). When we experience risk through 
our analytical system we consciously 
consider costs and benefits. Analytical 
risk processing is a rigorous and therefore 
slower process that must be explicitly taught 
(Swim et al., 2009). When we experience 
risk through our emotional system, it is a 
non-formal, automatic, individual process – we experience 
risk as an instinctive feeling, an urgent gut reaction (Weber, 
2006). The two systems reinforce each other, but in situations 
where their outputs differ, the emotional system generally 
dominates. In the case of  climate change there seems to be a 
conflict between the two systems: the emotional system is not 
sending warning signals, even though analytical assessment 
tells us that it is a huge problem (Swim et al., 2009). 
People’s fear of  risk often does not correspond to objective 
risk assessment. The same information can lead to different 
choices depending on how a risk is assessed (Weber, 2006). 
Experiments in analytical risk assessment have shown a bias 
for immediate benefits and a tendency to undervalue future 
outcomes (Gertner, 2009). When assessing risk emotionally, 
people tend to underestimate the danger of  events they have 
never experienced and events that appear physically and 
temporally distant, and to overestimate the likelihood of  low-
probability events if  they have personally experienced them 
(Gertner, 2009; Weber, 2006). People generally overestimate 
the likelihood of  easily imagined risks, and underestimate 
the risk of  things that happen relatively frequently (Sunstein 
When assessing risk emotionally, people  
tend to underestimate the danger of events  
they have never experienced and events  
that appear physically and temporally distant, 
and to overestimate the likelihood of  
low-probability events if they have  
personally experienced them. 
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and Thaler, 2008; Dawnay and Shah, 2005). People also 
discount the risk of  things they enjoy doing, as well as the 
risk of  things that they are familiar with (i.e. where they have 
daily exposure to a risk) (Bender et al., 2004; Swim et al., 
2009). The American Psychological Association warns that 
‘greater familiarity with climate change and its risks, unless 
accompanied by alarmingly large negative consequences, 
may actually lead to smaller rather than larger perceptions 
of  its riskiness’ (Swim et al., 2009, p.46).
Risk experienced via description is risk that is learned 
from experts, usually in the form of  statistical information. 
Risk experienced by recalling personal (bad) experience is 
more effective at prompting action than risk experienced via 
description, as it usually produces a strong visceral response 
(Gertner, 2009; Weber, 2006). Because climate 
change is characterised by uncertainty, and its 
effects are not yet being widely experienced 
(or at least noticed), people have to rely on 
descriptions of  the risks – scientific models and 
expert judgement, or media interpretations 
of  these – which do not favour immediate 
action. By the time we experience strong 
emotional responses to climate change that are based on 
personal experience, it may be too late to avoid particularly 
adverse outcomes (Swim et al., 2009; Weber, 2009; Zax, 
2009). Lejarraga (2009) found that people are willing to 
trade off  complicated, detailed information experienced 
by description for less accurate but simpler personally 
experienced information.
Research also shows that many people do not trust risk 
messages that come from scientists or government officials. 
This lack of  trust helps create reactance: a negative reaction 
towards policy or advice that appears to threaten individual 
freedom. The American Psychological Association emphasises 
that changing behaviour requires trust, especially when people 
believe that the change involves a cost (Swim et al., 2009).
Implication for environmental policy
• Weber argues that we need to find ways to evoke visceral 
reactions in people, by emphasising the local and short-
term effects of  climate change rather than trying to 
muster empathy for things that could happen to someone 
else, somewhere else (Weber, 2006; Zax, 2009).
People have a finite pool of worry and are susceptible to the 
single-action bias
Weber (2006) found that people have a finite pool of  worry. 
This means that we often struggle to maintain our fear of  
one problem when a new problem comes along. She also 
identifies the single-action bias occurring when one action 
(such as buying a hybrid car, or voting for a green candidate) 
effectively assuages the fear (climate change) that prompted 
the action, meaning that we don’t take further actions and 
are back where we started (Gertner, 2009; Weber, 2006). 
Implication for environmental policy
• Policy makers need to be aware of  these biases so that they 
do not abandon policy efforts aimed at one risk (climate 
change) in favour of  another (financial recession), and to 
ensure that they apply a range of  policy instruments that 
target problems most effectively.
Increased information does not necessarily lead to behaviour 
change
Abrahamse et al. (2005) found that increased information 
leads to higher levels of  knowledge, but not necessarily to 
behaviour change. McKenzie-Mohr and Smith found that 
campaigns relying only on providing information often have 
‘little or no effect’ on behaviour, and insist that most complex 
behaviour needs a multifaceted approach, which will also 
need to change over time (McKenzie-Mohr and Smith, 
1999, p.7).
Stern (2005) found that single-strategy approaches to 
behaviour change have largely been ineffective. This is 
because behaviour change depends on many factors, and 
targeting only one type of  behaviour is likely to make a 
difference to only a small percentage of  people.
Implications for environmental policy
• When distributing information, policy makers should 
look at the quality and framing of  the information, not 
the quantity.
• Policies should address actual and perceived barriers to 
behaviour change.
• Policies should use multifaceted, contextualised approaches 
to behaviour change rather than single-strategy 
approaches.
Conclusion 
Kaplan (2001) found that effective environmental policies 
‘must be based on a coherent conception of  human nature 
that speaks to the relationship between how people approach 
new information, how information relates to motivation, 
and how information and motivation relate to behavior 
change’ (p.1). Social psychology and behavioural economics 
offer effective, and potentially inexpensive, approaches to 
addressing these questions. Anthropogenic climate change 
is caused by human behaviour. Changing human behaviour 
is an important part of  addressing the problem of  climate 
change – whether it is changing individuals’ consumption 
habits, or enhancing decision-making processes to favour 
social outcomes over individual outcomes. If  policy makers 
apply an understanding of  social norms, cognitive biases, 
competing motivations, group dynamics, and other insights 
from social psychology and behavioural economics, they 
have the potential to significantly motivate environmentally 
beneficial changes in individual and group behaviour. 
Changing human behaviour is an important 
part of addressing the problem of climate 
change
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